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COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERM

Public policy is more tolerant towards agreements made while the
parties are living apart or in prospect of immediate separation, (which)
is conditioned upon a recognition that in such cases public policy is not
offended because the contract does not bring about the separation nor
promote the marital discord . . . The law encourages the resumption of
marital relations
and agreements which bring about such reconciliations
27
will be upheld.
Ronald B. Felman
op NON-MOLESTATION COVENANT OF SEPARATION
NOT DEFENSE IN SUIT TO RECOVER SUPPORT PAYMENTS
VIOLATION

AGREEMENT

Mrs. Shedler brought an action in Westchester County to recover payments claimed to be due under a separation agreement. The agreement stated
"that neither party shall molest the other, nor compel nor endeavor to compel
the other to dwell or cohabit with him or her by any legal proceeding or otherwise," and that "a default in any part of this agreement may at the option of
the non-defaulting party, be deemed a default under the entire agreement."
Mr. Shedler claimed the contract was void since Mrs. Shedler had violated the
covenant not to molest, and further that she had regularly molested, annoyed,
and interfered with defendant's family and business relations. Mrs. Shedler
moved for an order to strike the defense. Held, The 'wife's breach of nonmolestation provision of a separation agreement was no defense to wife's suit
even though the separation agreement provided that default of any part of
the agreement might at the option of the non-defaulting party be deemed a
default under the entire agreement, since these are independant clauses. Shedler
v. Slzedler, 12 N.Y.2d 828, 187 N.E.2d 311, 236 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1962).
Since matrimonial actions are concerned with the stability of the family,
the basic unit of society, the state has a vital interest in the existing marital
status of the parties.1 Such actions are not merely concerned with the private
rights of one of the parties, but with public rights. The public policy of the
state entails preservation of the existing marital relationship 2 Generally separation agreements which are supported by consideration or inducements which
tend to encourage divorce or separation or destroy the marital relationship are
against public policy. New York has consistently refused enforcement of a separation or support contract shown to be "part of a scheme to obtain or facilitate a
divorce, as when the husband promises to pay alimony as a reward to his wife
for getting a divorce, or when the money provisions for her support are a
premium or award, inducement or advantage to the wife for procuring a divorce."M However, the usual provisions for support payments do not by them27. Stahl v. Stahl, supra note 26, at 931, 939.
1. Senor v. Senor, 272 App. Div. 306, 316, 70 N.Y.S.2d 909, 917 (lst Dep't 1947),

aff'd, 297 N.Y. 800, 78 N.E.2d 20 (1948).

2. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 51.
3. Its re Rhinelander's Estate, 290 N.Y. 31, 37, 47 N.E.2d 681, 684 (1943).
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selves facilitate divorce and are valid, as are certain other terms which provide
a procedural modus operandi in settling a possible future divorce. 4 While the
state has recognized that marriage is the basis of orderly society and must be
preserved, in a realistic manner it has also recognized the inevitable destruction
of the marital status in certain instances. In these instances, public policy
requires that the termination of the relationship be arranged between the
husband and wife in an orderly and equitable manner. The underlying notion
of this policy is that such agreements, in a sense, preserve order in society.
"The will of the parties as expressed by their agreement should be disturbed
only where their agreement is repugnant to justice as between them or contrary
to the interests of society .

.

. 215 Subsidiary to the former, preservation of

ordered society also requires that once an agreement has been made, the support and maintenance provisions be continued in effect to assure the wife a
proper place in society, as well as to promote the continued well being and
security of any children. 6
Generally provisions in a separation agreement relating to support and
maintenance and those pertaining to molestation are held as independent
clauses in the absence of express terms providing for dependency. 7 This view
is often sustained by semantics, as where a court holds that such a covenant
goes only to a part of the consideration, or that the clauses are independent
per se.8 The husband cannot defend his wife's suit for enforcement of support
payments by claiming that her breach of a molestation clause is a condition
subsequent to his performance of the contract; but he may bring a separate
action for damages, or perhaps even counter-claim in the wife's suit. The key
to these decisions is public policy. Because of the inherent differences in the
duties and relationship of the parties, the rules of intent which apply to business contracts do not apply to separation agreements.0 Public policy calls for
the nonimpairment of the support provisions. This policy is based on two
overriding precepts: (1) the security of the wife and children must remain
undisturbed; and (2) while the husband is married he is under legal duty to
support his wife whether they live separately or not. A separation agreement
merely makes the husband's prior legal duty more explicit even though she enSchley v. Andrews, 225 N.Y. 110 (1919); Lake v. Lake, 136 App. Div. 47, 119 N.Y. Supp.
686 -(3d Dep't 1909); Deshler v. Rivas, 108 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 280
App. Div. 775, 113 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1st Dep't 1952).
4. In re Fleischer's Estate, 192 Misc. 777, 80 N.Y.S.2d 543 (Surr. Ct. 1948); Gershman v. Lafayette Nat. Bank, 178 Misc. 693, 35 N.Y.S.2d 4 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
5. Fales v. Fales, 160 Misc. 799, 801, 290 N.Y. Supp. 655, 658 (Sup. Ct. 1936),
aff'd, 250 App. Div. 751, 295 N.Y. Supp. 754 (1st Dep't 1937).
6. Borax v. Borax, 4 N.Y.2d 113, 149 N.E.2d 326, 172 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1958).
7. Fearon v. Aylesford, 14 Q.B.D. 792 (1884); Gloth v. Gloth 154 Va. 511, 153
S.E. 879 (1930); Annot., 71 A.L.R. 723 (1931).
8. For a scintillating discussion on this entire area cf. Annot., 160 A.L.R. 471
(1946).
9. Benesch v. Benesch, 106 Misc. 395, 173 N.Y. Supp. 629 (Munic. Ct. N.Y.C. 1918);
Fearon v. Aylesford, 14 Q.B.D. 792 (1884).
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gages in molestation.' ° Where the wife, who has no preexisting obligation to
the husband, promises to support him in an agreement, public policy does not
require that the clause be held independent.:" A New York court has intimated
that breach of a molestation clause would be a good defense to an action2
for support payments if the wife's breach was substantial and malicious.'
However, in Borax v. Borax, 4 N.Y.2d 113, 105 N.E.2d 326, 172 N.Y.S.2d
805 (1958), the leading New York case on construction of molestation clauses,
the Court takes a different view. There the wife brought an action for a new
agreement alleging the husband's violation of a nonmolestation clause had
vitiated a prior agreement. In the absence of an express provision making
continuation of the old contract dependent on nonmolestation by the husband,
the Court held the clause was independent and that the old agreement was
still valid. Therefore the old agreement precluded a subsequent action. The
Court concluded that since molestation consists of an attempt to restore the
marital status, a policy favored by the law, a nonmolestation clause which
purports to prohibit importunities to resume the marital relationship might
well be void, and should be construed as an independent covenant in order to
prevent vitiation of the entire agreement. Since presently effective support
provisions preclude the maintenance of separate actions it is impossible to
distinguish whether a molestation clause is dependent or independent according
to which party brings the action. It is unwise in both cases to hold that the
acrimonious interchanges common to marital dissolution, should end a separathe chief .. .object of which is to bring 3some stability
tion agreement "...
is at best a troublesome relationship."'
what
into
continuity
and
In sustaining Mrs. Shedler's motion to strike, the Court rejected defendant's contention that the continuance of the contract was dependant upon
nonmolestation, even though the contract was, in effect, fortified by such an
express provision. The Court ruled that the present contract -was within the
Borax rule. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same ground, in an opinion
from which three judges dissented. The dissent maintained that the present
case did not fall within the Borax rule because (1) that suit was brought to
avoid the impact of an existing separation agreement, and (2) the Borax
contract contained no express provision for termination of the contract for
molestation. The dissent concluded that the decisional law on which Borax
was based as well as the case itself, were not sufficient to establish a rule that
molestation clauses were independent per se, because neither contained an
express dependency provision.' 4 The dissent further stated that it is not be10. See generally, Annot., 160 A.L.R. 471, 478 (1946).
11. See Pezzoni v. Pezzoni, 38 Cal. App. 209, 175 Pac. 801 (1918).
12. Benesch v. Benesch, 106 Misc. 395, 173 N.Y. Supp. 629 (Munic. Ct. N.Y.C. 1918).
13. Borax v. Borax, 4 N.Y.2d 113, 116, 149 N.E.2d 326, 328, 172 N.Y.S.2d 805, 808
(1958).
14. Hughes v. Burke, 167 Md. 472, 175 AtI. 335 (1934); Stern v. Stern, 112
NJ. Eq. 8, 163 Ad. 149 (1932); Thomas v. Thomas, 104 N.J. Eq. 607, 146 At. 431 (1929).
Lindley, Separation Agreements § 9 (rev. ed. 1962).
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yond the power of a couple to expressly provide for termination of a separation
agreement because the husband's legal duty to support still subsists.'0 Further,
enforcing the agreement as is, would not deprive the wife of a remedy for
the enforcement of her rights because "she may acquiesce in the termination
of the agreement by bringing a matrimonial action and asking the court to fix
support ... [or] she may choose to rely on the agreement and bring an action
for its enforcement, in which case she can simultaneously and without repudiating the agreement bring a support proceeding in the State Family Court. 10
The practical effect of the instant decision is to virtually outlaw the
dependancy of molestation clauses in New York State. While the sanctity of
the parties agreement is a fundamental aspect of contractual relations, there
are certain situations in which this principle must be sacrificed to overriding
considerations of the public welfare. The molestation clause presents just such
a situation. Although it is abhorrent to concepts of fundamental justice to allow a wife to make a valid support agreement with her husband and then
flout the agreement by engaging in the forbidden conduct, it is more abhorrent
to conceptions of the public good to allow a husband to escape a responsibility
which continues to exist whether there is an agreement or not. There is no
rational basis for calling an end to an agreement on grounds of molestation,
because such conduct cannot be controlled by contractual provision. Bitter invectives and acrimonious interchanges have been an inherent characteristic
of marital dissolution since time began. No matter what the contingency, no
contract provision will ever eliminate them. Due to the husband's subsisting
duty to support, a provision for the express dependency of the molestation and
support clauses is equally futile because even if the agreement is terminated
on such grounds, the wife is not deprived of her right to support; but may
sue for maintenance in court and again engage in molestation. The only effective way the husband can control molestation is through a separate action.
In cases of substantial molestation, he has a claim legally cognizable in tort
for damages. Therefore, as a matter of public policy, these clauses should be
construed as independent, even in the face of express provisions to the contrary,
in order to preserve the support and maintenance provisions of the contract
and prevent continual suits upon an issue which cannot be controlled by the
agreement.
Thomas M. Agate
INSURANCE
STATE REGULATION OF CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE

Respondent Insurance Company issued thirteen policies of group credit
life insurance after the effective date of new provisions of the Insurance Law
15. Lipp v. Iipp, 218 App. Div. 788, 218 N.Y. Supp. 802 (2d Dep't 1926); Verdier
v. Verdier, 133 Cal. App. 2d 325, 284 P.2d 94 (1955); Smith v. Smith, 7 Cal. App. 2d
271, 46 P.2d 232 (1935); Lindley, op. cit. supra note 14.
16. Instant case at 831-32, 187 N.E.2d at 363, 236 N.Y.S.2d at 351 (1962).

